Paul Ricoeur noticed that the various body of knowledge, in their take on the human being, end up being insufficient in grasping humanity at its core. These “sciences” end up reducing the human being to static episodes that can be instrumentalized; thus, these analyses diminish the intricacy of a human being’s existence. Ricoeur begs the question “who is this being for whom being is in question?”[1]
Ricoeur
establishes that a human being is in between the infinite and finite poles of
which this theme in describing humans is evident in Plato, Pascal, and
Kierkegaard. Moreover, since humanity is situated in between the poles, he or
she is caught between a seeming conflict of goals. And in this
caught-in-the-middle situation lies humanity’s fallibility (tendency to err) which
constitutes his or her fragility. Thus, this situation calls for what Ricoeur
means on having a philosophical anthropology. Philosophical in the sense that
it does not anchor its analysis on the inevitability of the other sciences to
reduce humans to functional or operative descriptions. Furthermore,
philosophical anthropology tackles on the human being’s predicament as
finitude-infinitude-intermediary.
Philosophical
anthropology takes its roots in the Pathos or Wretchedness
(former is referring to Plato while the latter to Pascal), and this root is
born from the finitude-infinitude-intermediary situation of humanity. More so,
the stress on the intermediary is crucial because it is that which stands in
between the poles wherein this middle can pass through either to or fro to the
corruptible and incorruptible or finite and the infinite. Ricoeur notes that
even Plato, for a lack of a better term, analogizes in his description of the
intermediary as the “city” (as the center) and even mythologizes on the origin
such as the “fall” of the soul. In these descriptions or attempt to
appropriately linguistically express the intermediary, philosophical
anthropology takes place.
Moreover,
Ricoeur continues with the efforts of philosophical anthropology through Pascal.
Pascal’s description of the intermediary takes on a spatial form of reference
to that being in between the very large and the very small wherein such
situation he dubs as wretchedness. This situation makes humans caught in
between infinites that shows how limited one is in grasping the first
principles and can only make do what is apparent. To Pascal, “nothing can affix
the finite between the two infinites that both enclose and escape it.”[2]
Yet, this expression of the intermediary fails to suffice as an accurate
description of the human situation.
Ricoeur
then turns to Kierkegaard as the Danish's description speaks closely of what
the intermediary is. Thus, Ricoeur lifted a statement from Kiekegaard’s Sickness
Unto Death saying that humans or this intermediary is “a relation that
relates itself (freedom) and in relating itself to itself relates itself to
another.”[3]
This description offers more fluidity of the human situation as compared to
Plato and Pascal which simply describes the human situation as being caught in
the middle. However, Kierkegaard’s statement puts life to the intermediary as
something that is constantly in relation to something. Yet, Ricoeur sees
Kierkegaard’s statement as rhetorical.
In
the search for the appropriate notion of the intermediary that evades rather a
mythological or analogical referencing, Ricoeur turns to Kant’s transcendental
imagination as a “better” alternative to that of previous three thinkers.
Ricoeur posed the question on “why is this resistance of mythos to logos?”[4]
to show that even from the efforts of the philosophers, achieving a logos
into philosophical anthropology is a little bit farfetched.
In
Kant, the transcendental imagination is where the ability to situate oneself in
the present and projects beyond oneself occurs. This intermediary is considered
as the “fault line” that through reflection one can be then situated in between
sensibility and understanding. More so, the peculiar phenomenon of this
recognition of the transcendental intermediary among others is a presumption
through respect. Respect is wherein one sees in the other as in this
culminative situation of poles and then later on ascribes oneself through the
object, in turn, respecting oneself. Also, this transcendental imagination
stands above feeling and thinking, and it is a synthesis of the two. This
synthesis is evident in the object wherein in reflection, the intermediary can
be deduced. Thus, the human being, even amidst the dichotomy of being and
nothing or the finite and the infinite, acts as an intermediary of both. This
description then points to consciousness as in between wherein this
consciousness of the self, objects, and others is evidence enough to convey the
middle, the intermediary, or the third term facilitating all of these.[5]
After
establishing through descriptions what an intermediary is that constitutes the
interest of philosophical anthropology, Ricoeur “brings down” the intermediary
to the practical wherein the being in the middle is always in a situation, and
this time, a concrete one. Thus, Ricoeur sparks the antinomy of character and
happiness in the level of praxis.
For
Ricoeur, “character is the generalization of the notion of perspective”[6]
and that “perspective is the human point of view on things as things.”[7]
Using the previous description of the poles from the previous analysis,
character here is in the finite. Finite as it is, then it is limited to
perspectives that which it can grasp for the moment. Also, a perspective on
something assumes an intentionality towards that something wherein such
intentionality later on turns into desire especially, finite as a human being
is, humanity searches for what is lacking. Desire has its temporality embedded
in humanity’s finitude, yet the end of it all consummates in an infinitude
i.e., happiness. Thus, Ricoeur says that “character is the perspectival
orientation of our total field of motivation. Happiness is the end toward which
all my motivation is oriented.”[8]
The
polarity of character and happiness constitutes the human being i.e., acting in
the present and the immediate while pursuing the end and the infinite. Thus,
this polarity is what makes humans fragile. And this makes the quest to act
accordingly to the polarity which is to unite the polarities is a task due to
the constant tensions between character and happiness. Moreover, this fragility
and the task in uniting polarities presupposes that within the experience of
such, human beings feel. Feeling is an occurrence as an intermediary between
life and thoughts which enacts the intentionality towards something in an ever
more intimate fashion.
To
Ricoeur, feeling needs to have a place as this is the most intimate point
within a person. Feeling is this closeness with an experience, or an object as
contrasted to objectification which there is a sense of distance or detachment.
And “for a philosophical anthropology, knowing and feeling (objectivizing and internalizing)
go together.”[9]
Since feeling is this occurrence between bios and logos, in
feeling, then comes Pathos. This Pathos is also the thumos
wherein the instance of fragility is shown. The thumos, in its lack or
situatedness in the middle, has passions to compensate for the lack. And
Ricoeur borrows from Kant wherein the thumos can be linguistically
pointed out into the three passions namely a) having, b) power, and c) worth.
All of these three passions further describe or demythologizes the rather mystic
linguistic ascription of the intermediary as the thumos. So, in the act
of fulfilling these passions, human fragility takes into play. Humans desire
for all three with the goal as well to achieve happiness.
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN
FRAGILITY TO THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SPHERE
This analysis of Paul Ricoeur on the Antinomy
of Human Reality and the Problem of a Philosophical Anthropology shows the
tension that an individual experiences as he or she exist. In pointing out
human fragility as the quest in fulfilling the passions and that the human
situation is oscillating to and fro in the poles of finitude and infinitude or
character (perspectival) and happiness (infinite), Ricoeur shows the
fundamental Pathos one is immersed into. This experience of the Pathos
will lead to scenarios that will be critical once such is elevated into the
social sphere i.e., when man relates with others. Although the Pathos
can be smoothly seen as a fact of existence that one has to encounter with, the
implications of such when different Pathos or intermediaries meet
creates further tension.
Greater
problems will arise when different individuals, with presumed freedoms, in the
state of acting towards the fulfillment of desires, meet. This meet or
encounter with the other creates another struggle within human fragility as the
fulfillment of desires will encounter hurdles. However, mutuality and respect
can easily patch things up; yet the fragility remains and the problem of
steering away from what is agreed upon in mutuality is immanent due to the
fragility itself.
In
Ricoeur’s borrowing of Kant’s three passions (to appropriately “linguistify”
Plato’s thumos), having, power, and worth all spell a big dilemma in the
current social and political sphere. Once power is held by a person, then it
spells a huge struggle for the others in want of that passion as well. Issues
as such are tackled in Ricoeur’s other works. However, it is in this pinning
down of philosophical anthropology that gave us a possible picture of what will
be the problems once individuals are immersed in society.
The
big question lies in how can a community best cope up with its individual
fragilities? Although institutions are present to smoothen out the possible
anarchy when freedoms are all left at play without a greater intermediary, can
humanity achieve a commonality when it comes to their fragility especially that
in the fulfillment of the infinite (happiness) will encounter differences in
the various modes available to humanity (perspectival happiness or pleasure). Will
institutions suffice to be the greater intermediary for all individuals who are
mediating their own polarities in their existence?
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